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Abstract	  
Arbitration is a method frequently used throughout the world to settle disputes in the 
international arena. As it is a private procedure beyond the public eye with experts as judges 
and results in an award that generally is easier to enforce than court judgments, it may be the 
most efficient way of settling international disputes. To be entitled to commence arbitral 
proceedings instead of litigation, the only requirement is an agreement between two or more 
parties to do so. 
 
If a dispute then later arises where a third party, not signatory to the agreement, is so 
intertwined with the dispute that it seems impossible or maybe even unnecessary to resolve it 
without this third party being part of the proceedings, he cannot technically take part in the 
arbitration. If such an issue is at hand, or if a third party itself wants to invoke arbitration 
against one of the signatories, courts and arbitral tribunals have developed methods through 
which third parties can be bound to an arbitration agreement without its expressed consent.  
Using these methods can at first glimpse be seen as a measure of fairness and efficiency, 
however problems arise as the very foundation of arbitration, the consent of the parties, are 
bargained with. This thesis therefore explores the justifications behind two of the methods 
used today, the arbitral estoppel theory and group of companies doctrine, and discusses the 
implications they have on consent. 
 
This thesis concludes that as a result of the development of the arbitral estoppel method and 
the group of companies doctrine, the previously so important notion of consent in regard to 
arbitration has to a large extent been replaced by the consideration of efficiency and fairness 
when comes to joining third parties. 	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Over 2 500 years ago in the prosperous commercial center of Rome, contracts were entered 
into daily. At that time, the contracts were formed orally through the correspondence of 
questions and answers from the two parties. The questions and answers had to be a precise 
reflection of one another; otherwise the contract would be null and void.1 The importance of 
the precise congruence was upheld through the meeting of the parties.2 If the parties did not 
meet, no contract could be formed, as it was not clear that the parties had the exact same 
intentions. The meeting of the minds was by that the essence of contract making in the Roman 
Empire. Today however, parties to a contract do not need to meet for a contract to be formed, 
however the concept of consent would seem to be equally important.  
 
Arbitration is today the only forum outside of courts where a dispute can be settled with the 
result in an enforceable award. The only way to waive your fundamental right to a fair trial is 
by writing a contract to arbitrate. A contract in which you can state the terms of this 
alternative dispute settlement procedure, choose where the dispute should be settled, by 
whom and with reference to which national laws and/or international principles. The most 
fundamental principle of arbitration is therefore consent. 
 
Problems can thus arise when non-signatories to the arbitration agreement, who in absence of 
consent either wants to join the arbitration proceedings or has arbitration invoked against 
them. Today, several methods have been invented through case law through which non-
signatories either can be allowed or forced to take part in arbitral proceedings without their 
explicit consent. When applying these methods, courts and arbitral tribunals presume that 
consent from the non-signatories impliedly is at hand. However, this application may by that 
contravene the most basis principle of arbitration, consent.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Franklin Miller, Alan Wertheimer, The Ethics of Consent: Theory and Practice (Oxford University Press, 
2009) 40	  2	  Ibid 41	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1.2	  Topic	  and	  Research	  Questions	  
The topic of this thesis is “Binding Non-Signatories to Arbitration Agreements: The Issue of 
Consent in International Commercial Arbitration”. The thesis therefore aims to answer the 
following two questions: 
 
• Are the principles and requirements for a valid arbitration agreement, especially the 
requirement of consent, being upheld when the methods of arbitral estoppel and group 
of companies doctrine are applied? 
o How has the evolvement of the methods affected this fact? 	  
1.3	  Method	  and	  Disposition	  
To answer this, this thesis uses a legal dogmatic method when analyzing foremost the 
landmark case law on the area. The analysis will mainly focus on cases from England, France 
and United States as those countries most frequently apply the methods that will be discussed. 
Some reference to international conventions and agreements will also be made. The main text 
will mostly analyze the landmark- or most prominent cases of the area but will also include 
different scholar’s views on the topic, gathered both from articles and literature.  
 
The second chapter will first explain the main features in international commercial arbitration 
with focus on the arbitration agreement, as it is the basis of determining who are the real 
parties to the agreement. Second, the third and fourth chapters aim to explain, exemplify and 
analyze the development of two of the most interesting and controversial methods used to 
bind non-signatories to arbitration agreements, the arbitral estoppel theory and group of 
companies doctrine. Third, the fifth chapter will aim to bring forth the issues of enforcement 
that can arise when no unanimous view with regard to the methods of arbitral estoppel and 
group of companies doctrine can be found. Fourth, in the sixth chapter, a discussion and 
analysis regarding the issue of consent will be made. The analysis will relate to the arbitral 
estoppel theory and group of companies doctrine to exemplify the importance of, and the 
current position taken, when courts and tribunals apply the methods. In the seventh and last 
chapter, the conclusions drawn from the previous chapters will be stated, as well as 
recommendations for the future.   	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2	  International	  Commercial	  Arbitration	  and	  the	  Arbitration	  
Agreement	  
2.1	  Introduction	  to	  Arbitration	  and	  the	  Third	  Party	  Problem	  
Arbitration is today the principal way of solving disputes in international trade, commerce 
and investment.3 The process is efficient, private and relatively cheap. Almost everything that 
concerns the process can be agreed upon by the parties. The arbitrators can for example be 
handpicked experts, the procedure can be completely confidential and the process can take 
place in a neutral country, everything of the parties’ choice.4 Furthermore, the award can 
through the New York Convention5 be enforced in most countries all over the world and the 
possibilities for appeal of the final award are few, upholding the efficiency of arbitral 
proceedings.6 
 
When it comes to arbitration, the fundament is the agreement by the parties to arbitrate. The 
cornerstone is by that consent. In contrast to court proceedings where jurisdiction over the 
parties is based on the dispute at hand, arbitration proceedings draws its jurisdiction from the 
agreement of the parties.7 It is therefore more problematic when third parties, not signatories 
to that agreement, want to join the arbitral proceedings. Through case law around the world, 
different methods have developed that binds non-signatories or even third parties to 
arbitration agreements. Examples of these methods are agency, subrogation, estoppel, third 
party beneficiary, group of companies doctrine and incorporation by reference.8 Different 
views in regard to binding non-signatories are however taken by both nations and scholars 
worldwide. Some argue that joining third parties to an arbitration agreement is extending that 
agreement to cover an actual non-party9 while some argue that the methods does not extend 
the agreement, they merely help to find the true parties to it.10  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Nigel Blackaby and others, Redfern and Hunter on International Commercial Arbitration (5th edn, Oxford 
University Press 2009) para 1.01	  4	  Ibid para 1.05	  5	  The New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958 	  6 Ibid para 1.92	  7	  Bernard Hanotiau B, ‘Consent to Arbitration: Do We Share a Common Vision?’ (2011) 27 Arbitration 
International 539 	  
8 Merrill Lynch Inv Managers v Optibase Ltd 337 F 3d 125, 131 (2nd Cir 2003) 
9 See for example Pierre Mayer, ‘The Extension of the Arbitration Clause to Non-Signatories: The Irreconcilable 
Position of French and English Courts’ (2012) 27 American University International Law Review 831 and 
Blaise Stucki, Wittmer Schellenberg, ‘Extension of Arbitration Agreements to Non-Signatories’ (ASA Below 40 
Conference, Geneva, September 2006)  
10  Gary B Born, International Commercial Arbitration (2nd edn, Kluwer Law International, 2009) 1139 
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Binding non-signatories is a matter of big controversy as different levels of consent is 
accepted worldwide. Some countries hold to the importance of consent where clear evidence 
has to show that the parties actually intended to arbitrate while others focus more on the 
effectiveness and necessity of flexibility in the context of international commerce. These 
differences can lead to several problems. First, the predictability in international trade 
diminishes when it is possible to have arbitration invoked against you without your agreement 
to be included in such proceedings. Second, the final award that should be enforceable all 
over the world might be refused due to the fact that non-signatories have been joined to the 
proceedings. Binding non-signatories is however important as arbitration by that is kept a 
commercially efficiency and competitive system of solving international disputes. It also 
makes arbitration effective, flexible and develops and expands international trade.  
 
A further introduction relating to some key aspects of international commercial arbitration 
will now follow as these are essential for the understanding of the thesis in general but the 
discussion relating to consent in particular. 
 
2.2	  Applicable	  Law	  with	  regard	  to	  Binding	  Non-­‐Signatories	  
When interpreting who is a party to the dispute at hand and by that the party obliged to 
arbitrate, the law applicable to the arbitration agreement is the one to apply.11 The parties may 
always choose the law that should apply to their arbitration agreement. The parties’ choice of 
law will in such cases always prevail. 12 If the parties have made no such choice, the court or 
arbitral tribunal applies the law relating to the substantive terms of the main agreement.13 This 
would in most cases mean that they use the domestic law of the country where the arbitration 
proceedings takes place.14 It is therefore important, in all disputes relating to international 
commercial arbitration, that the parties either have agreed on the applicable law or are aware 
of which rules that might be used in the proceedings. This is especially important with regard 
to joining non-signatories as different jurisdictions accepts or uses different methods of 
binding non-signatories to the contract.15 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Ibid 1153 
12 ICC Case No 1512 of 1971 YBCA 171 (1980) 
13 James P Gaffney, ‘The Group of Companies Doctrine and the Law Applicable to the Arbitration Agreement’ 
(2004) 19(6) Mealey’s International Arbitration Report, 6 
14 James M Hosking, ‘Non-Signatories and International Arbitration in the United States: the Quest for Consent’ 
(2004) 20 Arbitration International 289, 296 
15 Andrew Tweeddale, Keren Tweeddale, Arbitration of Commercial Disputes: International and English Law 
and Practice (1st edn, Oxford University Press 2005) 180 
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As this thesis in chapter 5 will discuss enforcement issues relating to joining non-signatories, 
it is also important to note that the applicable law for the enforcement of the award is the law 
of the country of enforcement. Hence, where the loosing party has its assets and not the law of 
the country in which the arbitral award was made.16 
 
2.3	  The	  Requirements	  for	  a	  valid	  Arbitration	  Agreement	  
For there to be a valid arbitration, there has to be a valid arbitration agreement. This means 
that there has to exist an offer and acceptance, consideration, capacity of the parties and the 
intention from the same to enter into a legal relationship.17  If these requirements are at hand, 
an agreement can be formed. There are then two different ways as of today to draft an 
arbitration agreement. The first, and most common, is to incorporate an arbitration clause 
within the main contract, which is done in conjunction with the negotiation of the rest of the 
contract. The other possible way is to draft an agreement after the dispute has arisen, an 
agreement that then would be called a submission agreement.18  
 
The most important international standard on the subject is the New York Convention. In 
Article II(1), four requirements are specified that all needs to be fulfilled for there to be a 
valid arbitration agreement. The agreement needs to be in writing and deal with existing or 
future disputes. These disputes in turn has to arise in respect of a defined legal relationship, 
whether contractual or not, and concern a subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration. 
There are two additional requirements in Article V(1a), which states that the parties cannot be 
in incapacity when entering into the arbitration agreement or that the agreement itself is 
deemed invalid under the applicable law. The only requirement discussed further will be the 
in writing requirement. 
 
It is further important to note that the uniform and internationally accepted rule regarding the 
arbitration agreement is that only the parties to the agreement are bound by it.19 The goal 
should by that be to find the true parties to the agreement, and not to bind non-consenting 
parties to the same. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Ibid 
17 Nigel Blackaby and others, Redfern and Hunter on International Commercial Arbitration (5th edn, Oxford 
University Press 2009) para 1.93 
18 Ibid para 1.40 
19 United Steelworkers of America v Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co 363 U.S. 574 (US Supreme Court 1960) 
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2.3.1	  The	  ‘in	  writing’	  Requirement	  set	  forth	  in	  the	  New	  York	  Convention	  
The New York Convention with 149 countries as signatories20 takes to the question of the 
formal requirements regarding the arbitral agreement and the view taken in this convention is 
strict. In Article II(1) it is made clear that for a country to recognize a foreign award, the 
arbitration agreement needs to be in writing. Article 11(2) explains the ‘in writing’ as either a 
contract signed by the parties or a contract gathered from the exchange of letters or telegrams. 
The meaning of this is clear. For there to be a valid arbitration agreement, one of these two 
requirements needs to be at hand. This would, if applicable, mean that the possibilities to bind 
a non-signatory are small due to the fact that the New York Convention does not include oral 
or tacit acceptance to an arbitration agreement. However, different ways of interpreting the 
requirement has developed over the last years. Some courts, both in civil- and common law 
jurisdictions, argue that since the purpose of writing Article II was to exclude tacit 
acceptance, the arbitration agreement should actually be in writing.21 Others however take a 
wider approach arguing that the requirement that an agreement only is valid if written would 
no longer be in line with todays commercial practice or contract law, where implied consent 
in most countries is part. They also argue that as long as consent can be established, either 
expressly or impliedly, the requirement is fulfilled.22  
 
The UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration of 1985 (the Model 
Law) aimed to loosen the requirements of the New York Convention. In Article 7(2) it is 
stated that the agreement shall be in writing. However, Article 7(3) states that the agreement 
can be made orally, by conduct or by other means as long as the agreement is recorded in 
some way. This would mean that if an arbitration agreement is put forth in some form and the 
other party does not object to it, an agreement is at place.23 Oral and tacit acceptance is by that 
accepted.24 A further discussion and analysis regarding this requirement will be made in 
chapter 6. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 <http://www.newyorkconvention.org/new-york-convention-countries/contracting-states> accessed 2013-11-19 
21 Report of the Committee on the Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards, UN Doc E/2704, note 30, Art. 
II(a) (1955) available at <www.uncitral.org> 
22 Gary B Born, International Commercial Arbitration (2nd edn, Kluwer Law International, 2009) 596 
23 Ng Kin Kenneth v HK Football Association Ltd (1994) 1 HKC 734 
24 Gary B Born, International Commercial Arbitration (2nd edn, Kluwer Law International, 2009) 606 
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2.4	  The	  Separability	  Principle	  
Another important factor to note, which also shall be discussed in more detail in chapter 6 of 
this thesis, is the workings of one of the cornerstones of arbitration, the separability principle. 
This principle holds that all arbitration agreements are separate or autonomous in regard to the 
main- or underlying contract of which it forms a part.25 An arbitration agreement is by that a 
separate contract and juridically independent from the main contract.26 What this means is for 
example in the circumstance that the main contract is deemed invalid, the arbitration 
agreement can still stand. Thus, if a conflict arises relating to the main contract, which is for 
example terminated, the arbitration clause is still binding and can be used to initiate 
arbitration.27 The separability principle also has the effect that different national law can be 
applicable to the arbitration agreement as opposed the main contract.28 The arbitration 
agreement by that has its own formal validity, substantive validity, choice of law, and 
allocations of jurisdictional competence.29 
 
2.5	  Common-­‐	  and	  Civil	  Law	  
As the discussion below will entail both common- and civil law references, it is important to 
explain the basics of common law, as it is widely different from civil law.  
 
Of uttermost importance is this first statement about common law; its basis is case law, not 
legislation.30 The primary sources in common law countries are thereby both judgments and 
legislation.31 Even though legislation, where it exists, ranks higher than case law, 32 almost all 
rules, and especially in regard to contract law, are based on case law and not legislation.33 The 
rulings from the courts have to be followed according to the principle of precedents or stare 
decisis.34 The older the case law, the more cautious the courts are in changing it.35 As consent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Ibid 311 
26 ICC Case no 8938, XXIVa YBCA 174, 176 (1999) 
27 Nigel Blackaby and others, Redfern and Hunter on International Commercial Arbitration (5th edn, Oxford 
University Press 2009) para 1.53 
28 Gary B Born, International Commercial Arbitration (2nd edn, Kluwer Law International, 2009) 313 
29 Ibid 348 
30 Andrew Borrows, English Private Law (3rd edn, Oxford University Press, 2013) para 1.21 
31 John Cartwright, Contract Law: An Introduction to the English Law of Contract for the Civil Lawyer (1st edn, 
Hart Publishing 2007) 12 
32 Andrew Borrows, English Private Law (3rd edn, Oxford University Press, 2013) para 1.25 
33 Ibid para 1.62 
34 Michael H Whincup, Contract Law and Practice: the English System and Continental Comparisons (4th edn, 
Kluwer Law International 2001) 4 
35 John Cartwright, Contract Law: An Introduction to the English Law of Contract for the Civil Lawyer (1st edn, 
Hart Publishing 2007) 21 
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is one of the foundations of contract law, which in turn is deeply rooted in case law, 
especially English courts are reluctant to change this basis fact.  
 
Even though the U.S. as well as England, is a common law country, the law has developed in 
another direction. It still has its basis in the English common-, and thereby case law, but with 
additional influence from other jurisdictions. 36 The U.S. has for example adopted the good 
faith doctrine, which is seen in European civil law countries. They have also created the 
doctrine of estoppel. These examples can be compared to English law, which is less open in 
regard to such ideas.37 
 
Civil law on the other hand is derived from the statues, in turn adopted by the legislative 
powers through parliamentary process in the country. Cases are secondary to the statues. This 
means that, opposite to the common law system, the decisions of courts do not per se have 
binding force on subsequent cases, even though it has significance. The decisions from courts 
should only be seen as applying the legislative provisions.38  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 E. Allan Farnsworth, United States Contract Law (rev edn, Juris Publishing 1999) 51 
37 John Cartwright, Contract Law: An Introduction to the English Law of Contract for the Civil Lawyer (1st edn, 
Hart Publishing 2007) 10 
38 Ibid 20 
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3	  Arbitral	  Estoppel	  
As stated above, consent is the cornerstone of arbitration.39 As consent, and especially 
implied consent, is hard to prove, theories and methods have developed to presume or easier 
prove that implied consent is at hand. Two of the most prominent, but controversial, methods 
of doing so are the arbitral estoppel theory and the group of companies doctrine. The first, 
developed in the U.S. and the latter in France to deal with this practical problem of proving 
implied consent. 
 
The following two chapters will aim to analyze how these two methods are applied to 
presume implied consent in international commercial arbitration and the scope of consent is 
stretched to its limits. The analysis will explain the methods, pinpoint the justifications for 
them, and show the still ongoing development of the two.  
 
In this chapter, a thorough description and analysis of the arbitral estoppel theory will be 
made. It will start with an explanation of the basic rules and requirements for the application 
of the theory and then, through landmark cases, an analysis of the development and current 
state of the method of estoppel will be conducted. 
 
3.1	  Arbitral	  Estoppel	  in	  Theory	  
When talking of or referring to the method of estoppel, not many people or even lawyers in 
civil law countries know what this principle entails. The method, developed and used mostly 
in the U.S., states that one cannot withdraw from a taken legal position or act.40 To describe 
the estoppel theory with an easy example, imagine a company that acts in accordance with a 
contract of sales, for example by delivering goods and by receiving benefits, i.e. payments 
from that very contract. The company has by that taken an active part in the contract as it has 
derived benefits from it. It cannot later avoid the burdens of that same contract. What this 
means is if a dispute would arise, for example regarding faults in the goods, the company 
cannot escape from solving this problem by stating that it was never a party to the contract 
and that the terms therefore does not apply to it. As the company has received benefits from 
the contract, it cannot escape the burdens of the same contract; it is estopped (stopped) from 
escaping.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Gary B Born, International Commercial Arbitration (2nd edn, Kluwer Law International, 2009) 1133 
40 Kunal Mimani, Ishan Jhingran, ‘Extension of Arbitration Agreements to Non-Signatories: An International 
Perspective’ (2007) 4(3) India Law Journal <http://www.indialawjournal.com/volume4/issue_3/article_6.html> 
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What this means in regard to arbitral estoppel and joining the non-signatories to arbitration 
proceedings is if a non-signatory has acted in accordance with a contract containing an 
arbitration clause or agreement, it is estopped from withdrawing from that contract and by 
that also from the arbitration agreement. In short, if a dispute arises in regard to the contract 
the company has acted in accordance with, it cannot litigate. It has to arbitrate the dispute as 
he is estopped from not accepting the burdens of the contract, i.e. arbitration.  
 
A quote from the case of Washington Mutual Financial Group LCC v Bailey41 defines the 
workings of estoppel as: ”[it] precludes a party from claiming the benefits of a contract while 
simultaneously attempting to avoid the burdens that contract imposes”42. And as the court 
pointed out in the case of Fluor Daniel Intercontinental, Inc. v General Electric Co43, a non-
signatory cannot “rely on the contract when it works to their advantage […] but then 
repudiate the contract and its arbitration clause when they believe it works against them”.44 
 
Arbitral estoppel is by that the method where one can bind a third party or non-signatory with 
the basis solely in that party’s actions. It is a way of presuming that implied consent by 
conduct exists and the goal is to find the true intentions of the parties.45 The method has in the 
U.S. become an accepted and natural part of their contract law, making it a justified mean of 
presuming implied consent in all kinds of different contractual circumstances. In regard to 
arbitration, the method is likewise an accepted part of the U.S. system of contract 
interpretation. 
 
One of the justifications for using the estoppel method is to end up with a result that is fair. 
Also, it protects the party of a contract from being harmed by another’s voluntary conduct. As 
an example, it would not be fair if a non-signatory is taking advantage of a contract and then 
escape the arbitration agreement stated within. The non-signatory is estopped from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Washington Mutual Financial Group LLC v Bailey 364 F 3d 260 (5th Cir 2004) 
42 Ibid 267 
43 Fluor Daniel Intercontinental Inc. v General Electric Co 1999 WL 637236 (SDNY 1999) 
44 William W. Park, ‘Non-Signatories and International Contracts: An Arbitrator’s Dilemma’ in Lawrence W. 
Neuman and Richard D. Hill (eds), The Leading Arbitrators’ Guide to International Arbitration (2nd edn, Juris 
Net, 2008) para 1.49 
45 Ibid para 1.13 
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withdrawing from arbitration invoked against him by a signatory. He can’t take advantage of 
the contract and then be free from disputing about it.46 
 
When comes to the method of arbitral estoppel, there are two different methods. These are 
applicable in different situations and have different requirements but both end up with the 
same outcome, that the concerned party is estopped from withdrawing from the contract.  
 
First, we have the method of equitable estoppel that could be summed up as estoppel through 
fairness reasons. Here, the requirement is one. By accepting a substantial and direct benefit 
arising from the contract containing an arbitration clause, the party also accepts the burdens of 
that contract. 47 A benefit could for example entail the ability to preform in accordance with 
the contract. The party cannot later escape the burdens of that contract and the method of 
equitable estoppel would by that be in line with the example of estoppel given above.  
 
Second, we have the method of intertwined estoppel where two criterions have to be at hand. 
First, the dispute that has arisen needs to be intertwined with the contract containing the 
arbitration clause. This means that the dispute needs to relate to, or be connected with, the 
contract of which the party invoking arbitration derives the arbitration agreement from. 
Second, there has to exist a contractual or close corporate link between the non-signatory and 
one of the signatories to the contract. 48  This would for example mean that the companies 
exist in the same corporate family or have other similar corporate ties. The requirement could 
also be fulfilled if the non-signatory and signatory have contractual links that connect them to 
one another, for example if they previously have worked closely together.49  
 
As this only states the requirements for the two subparts of estoppel, they will in the 
following segments be further explained and exemplified. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 James M Hosking, ’The Third Party Non-Signatory’s Ability to Compel International Commercial Arbitration: 
Doing Justice without Destroying Consent’ (2004) 4 Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal 469, 483 
47 Stavros Brekoulakis, Third Parties in International Commercial Arbitration (1st edn, Oxford University Press 
2010) 129 
48 Ibid 
49 Ibid 139 
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3.2	  Arbitral	  Estoppel	  in	  Practice	  
3.2.1	  Intertwined	  and	  Equitable	  Estoppel	  Explained	  
To get an understanding of how the two methods of the arbitral estoppel theory work in 
practice, landmark cases of the area will be described, analyzed and commented. A case 
where the basis of the theory is explained is the case of Mundi v Union Security Life 
Insurance Co50. Here, a loan agreement with an arbitration clause was drafted between Mundi 
and Wells Fargo. Relating to this loan agreement, the Union Security Life Insurance 
Company issued credit insurance on behalf of Mundi. As a dispute arose in regard to this 
insurance, Union Security wanted to invoke arbitration against Mundi by the method of 
intertwined estoppel. This due to the close ties between both the companies but especially the 
two contracts at hand. Union Security held that even if they were not a party to the loan 
agreement, which entailed the arbitration agreement, they could still invoke arbitration on the 
grounds that the contracts were so intertwined with one another that they should be seen as 
one. Mundi on the other hand, held that as no arbitration agreement was signed between 
Mundi and Union Security, arbitration could not be possible.  
 
The case ended up in the United States Court of Appeals, which first stated that they would 
use general principles of contract interpretation when deciding on the matter. This, as we later 
will see, is an important factor to note as the basis of interpreting a contract, even in those 
cases where estoppel is at hand, always has to be within the boundaries or scope of contract 
law and practice. By emphasizing this fact, the court points out that the focus when question 
is of binding a non-signatory or third party is on finding actual consent and discovering the 
true intentions of the parties.  
 
The court then examined the requirements for estoppel in arbitration, developed the reasoning 
for them and identified two types of the method. First, in regard to equitable estoppel, the 
court stated that a non-signatory is to be held to an arbitration agreement where the non-
signatory “knowingly exploits the agreement containing the arbitration clause despite having 
never signed the agreement”51. Second, in regard to the method of intertwined estoppel, the 
court summarized the requirements and a non-signatory may be required to arbitrate “because 
of the close relationship between the entities involved, as well as the relationship of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Mundi v Union Security Life Insurance Co 555 F 3d 1042 (9th Cir 2009) 
51 I.E. DuPont de Nemours & Co v Rhone Poulenc Fiber & Resin Intermediates 269 F 3d 187, 199 (3d Cir 2001) 
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alleged wrongs to the non-signatory’s obligations and duties in the contract and the fact that 
the claims were intertwined with the underlying contractual obligations”52.  
 
The court also made reference to the case of Sokol Holdings Inc. v BMB Munai Inc.53 where it 
was stated that it was “essential in all of these cases that the subject matter of the dispute was 
intertwined with the contract providing for arbitration”54 and that “a relationship among the 
parties of a nature that justifies a conclusion that the party which agreed to arbitrate with 
another entity should be estopped from denying an obligation to arbitrate a similar dispute 
with the adversary which is not a party to the arbitration agreement”55. In regard to this last 
fact, Mundi held that as no reference was made to other parties in the loan agreement, no 
other parties could be seen as relating to the main contract. Union Security on the other hand 
held that the reason for issuing the credit insurance was the loan agreement, and the contracts 
should be seen as two contracts intertwined with one another. 
 
With these factors explained, in the case of Mundi56 the decision from the court was that since 
the credit insurance was not “intertwined with the contract providing for arbitration”57, i.e. not 
in any way referred to in the loan agreement, arbitration could not be invoked by the non-
signatory. In addition did the claim not “arise[ ] out of or relate[ ] directly to”58 the main 
contract, and by that it failed to meet the first requirement, i.e. that the contracts need to be 
intertwined with one another. 
 
This conclusion by the court, even taking a pro-arbitration perspective, has to be deemed the 
correct one. The signatories to the arbitration agreement had explicitly written in their 
contract that it only concerned them and that the contract was not to be extended to a third 
party. It seems unlikely that the court therefore would be able to interpret implied consent into 
the arbitration agreement when it both clearly stated the parties concerned and explicitly 
excluded outsiders.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Ibid 201 
53 Sokol Holdings Inc. v BMB Munai Inc. 542 F 3d 354 (2nd Cir 2008) 
54 Ibid 361 
55 Ibid 359 
56 Mundi v Union Security Life Insurance Co 555 F 3d 1042 (9th Cir 2009) 
57 Sokol Holdings Inc. v BMB Munai Inc. 542 F 3d 354, 361 (2nd Cir 2008) 
58 Brantley v Republic Mortgage Insurance Co 424 F 3d 392, 396 (4th Cir 2005)  
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Furthermore, holding this last statement in mind, the court identified one of the important 
factors when discussing estoppel. It quoted the previous case of United Steelworkers of 
America v Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co59 in which it is stated, “arbitration is a matter of 
contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not 
agreed to submit”60. The court also made reference to the case of Victoria v Superior Court61 
and cited that “however broad may be the terms of a contract, it extends only to those things 
concerning which it appears that the parties intended to contract”62. This further emphasizes 
the basis of arbitration, consent, and the importance to actually find implied consent within 
the arbitration agreement. As these cases are from 1959 and 1985, the strict view here taken 
might, as we later will see, have been loosened in the last couple of years.  
 
To exemplify the early use of the equitable estoppel theory the buyer in the Avila Group Inc. v 
Norma J of California63 of 1977 wanted damages in regard to a contract containing an 
arbitration clause as the seller had breached the contract. The contract was signed when the 
buyer had accepted the purchase orders but as the buyer had not read the small print, in which 
the arbitration clause was clearly stated, he held that he had not expressly agreed to the 
arbitration clause and therefore did not want to arbitrate. The court however held that 
arbitration should be invoked against him, as he wanted the damages arising out of the very 
same contract as from which the arbitration agreement he wanted to avoid did.64  
 
The court argued that the buyer could not be allowed to hold the contract for valid in regard to 
those parts to which he wanted damages from the seller but at the same time contradictorily 
hold the contract invalid in order to avoid the arbitration agreement. The court stated, “to 
allow the buyer to claim the benefits of the contract and simultaneously avoid its burdens 
would both disregard equity and contravene the purposes underlying enactment of the 
Arbitration Act.”65. This last quote, seen out of its context, could be interpreted as allowing 
merely equity reasons for binding non-signatories, which by an analysis of the rest of the case 
seems not to have been the courts intention. The court did not mainly invoke arbitration on 
the basis that the non-signatory received a benefit from the contract but merely due to the fact 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 United Steelworkers of America v Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co 363 U.S. 574 (US Supreme Court 1960) 
60 Ibid 624 
61 Victoria v Superior Court 40 Cal 3d (1985) 
62 Ibid 734 
63 Avila Group Inc v Norma J of California 426 F Supp 537 (SDNY 1977) 
64 Ibid 542 
65 Ibid 
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that the buyer actually had signed the contract (even though he had not read the conditions 
closely enough). Expressed consent was by that a factor in the case and it seems that binding 
the party to the arbitration agreement was done so foremost on the basis of that signature and 
not for equity reasons. This quote would later however be one of the sources to which 
reference would be made when interpreting equity and fairness through conduct in the 
arbitration context. This will be shown below. 
 
3.2.2	  The	  Continued	  Development	  of	  the	  Equity	  Approach	  
We now skip several years forward to the case of International Paper v Schwabedissen 
Maschinen & Anlagen Gmbh66 to understand the evolvement of the equity approach, partly 
due to the Avila case. The case of International Paper concerned a contract between a 
manufacturer (Schwabedissen Maschinen) and a distributer (Wood) containing an arbitration 
clause. The buyer (International Paper), who in turn had contracted with the distributor, 
brought up a claim relating to a warranty set in the contract between the manufacturer and the 
distributor. International Paper tried to sue in court but Schwabedissen Maschinen replied that 
as the dispute only concerned the manufacturer-distributor contract, in which there was an 
arbitration agreement, arbitration proceedings should instead be initiated. The question for the 
court would therefore be if arbitration could be invoked against the non-signatory only on the 
grounds of two other separate parties’ contract. The court concluded that arbitration was 
possible and the buyer was by that estopped from going ahead with the court proceedings and 
instead had to arbitrate its claims.67  
 
The court reasoned that as the manufacturer-distributer contract was the entire factual 
foundation for the claims International Paper had against Schwabedissen Maschinen, they 
should proceed with arbitration. If International Paper were to be able to use that contract to 
claim its rights, and as their entire case was dependent on the rights arising out from that 
contract, it would be unfair for International Paper to be able to enforce those rights but at the 
same time avoid the burdens from the same, i.e. avoid the arbitration agreement.68 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 International Paper v Schwabedissen Maschinen & Anlagen Gmbh 206 F 3d 411 (4th Cir 2000) 
67 Ibid 418 
68 Ibid 
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The previously emphasized reason of equity in the Avila-ruling was cited and interpreted in 
the case when stating that: 
 
In the arbitration context, the doctrine recognizes that a party may be estopped 
from asserting that the lack of his signature on a written contract precludes 
enforcement of the contract’s arbitration clause when he has consistently 
maintained that other provisions of the same contract should be enforced to 
benefit him. “To allow [a plaintiff] to claim the benefit of the contract and 
simultaneously avoid its burdens would both disregard equity and contravene 
the purposes underlying enactment of the Arbitration Act.”69 
 
This could indicate a development towards a higher level of focus on these equity reasons 
when basing the decision on the non-signatories use of the contract, from which it derives the 
benefits. This in contrast to the Avila case where the main reason still was the signature from 
the party. The reference to equity in the Avila case only seemed secondary to the actual 
consent derived from the signature and more as a background justification for the judgment. 
 
Even if this case suggests a development of the equitable theory of estoppel, it becomes even 
more evolved in the case of American Bureau of Shipping v Tencara Shipyard70. Here, the 
company Tencara entered into a contract to build a yacht. For that, the American Bureau of 
Shipping (ABS) had to classify the yacht. For this, a contract with an arbitration agreement 
was drafted between Tencara and ABS. Later on, the yacht was damaged and it was clear that 
the reasons for this damage were poor design and construction, matters that ABS were 
responsible for ensuring. Therefore Tencara sued ABS in Italy and the yacht owners in turn 
sued ABS in France. ABS brought both cases to New York to arbitrate to make all parties join 
the same dispute. The yacht owners on the other hand held that they had never signed the 
arbitration agreement and therefore did not want to arbitrate.  
 
The court however held that the yacht owners should be deemed to arbitrate on the basis of 
equitable estoppel. The reason was that the owners received benefits from the agreement 
between Tencara and ABS as the classification ABS had made lowered the insurance rates for 
the owners. The owners were by that estopped from not arbitrating when they already had 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Ibid 
70 American Bureau of Shipping v Tencara Shipyard 170 F 3d 349 (2nd Cir 1999) 
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gotten benefits from the contract containing the arbitration clause.71 The rationale for this 
final decision was made in short as the court stated: 
 
It is patent that on the actual facts the owners received direct benefits from the 
ICC [the document drafted by ABS for ensuring the construction]. Without the 
ICC, registration would have been practically impossible. The owners are hence 
required to arbitrate their claims against ABS.72 
 
This decision, as previously stated, further developed the equity approach. The court did not 
require the claim arising out of, or having its factual foundations in, the contract as in the 
International Paper case. It was content with the fact that any benefit that could be seen at the 
non-signatory’s end relating to the contract with the arbitration clause was enough to have 
arbitration invoked against him. 
 
When relying on these equity-reasons developed and evolved in the stated cases above, the 
courts seem to have accepted the binding not only of non-signatories to the agreement but 
outside-coming third parties as well. 
 
3.2.3	  The	  Continued	  Development	  of	  the	  Intertwined	  Approach	  
For this thesis especially interesting is the intertwined version of estoppel. This, as the method 
to a greater extent than the equitable version affects the basis of arbitration, i.e. consent. 
 
In the case of McBro Planning Development v Triangle Electrical Construction73 both parties 
had separate contracts with a hospital that contained arbitration agreements. The hospital was 
to be renovated but a dispute arose between the construction manager (McBro) and the 
electrical engineer (Triangle), between which no contracts or arbitration agreements existed. 
Triangle claimed that McBro harassed and hampered its work and wanted to litigate the 
matter. McBro on the other hand, with reference to both parties separate arbitration 
agreements with the hospital, wanted arbitration proceedings to commence. Although the 
separate contracts clearly stated that they only applied to the two signatory companies to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Kunal Mimani, Ishan Jhingran, ‘Extension of Arbitration Agreements to Non-Signatories: An International 
Perspective’ (2007) 4(3) India Law Journal <http://www.indialawjournal.com/volume4/issue_3/article_6.html> 
72 American Bureau of Shipping v Tencara Shipyard 170 F 3d 349, 353 (2nd Cir 1999) 
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contract74 and no contractual agreements were found between McBro and Triangle, the court 
found that the claims of Triangle were intimately founded in and intertwined with McBro’s 
underlying contract with the hospital.75 . The Eleventh Circuit therefore held that arbitration 
should be the form of dispute settlement, not litigation, this even though Triangle was a non-
signatory to the contract containing the arbitration clause between McBro and the hospital.  
 
The court in regard to the fact that no written agreement existed between McBro and Triangle, 
made reference to the case of Hughes Masonry Co v Greater Clark County School Building 
Corporation76. Here, almost identical circumstances were at hand and the court held that a 
non-existing arbitration agreement between two companies were not an obstacle for 
arbitration. Even without a contract it was enough that the basis of the contractor’s claim 
against the construction manager was the managers breach of the contractor-owner contract. 
This reasoning was also found in the case of McBro. The contracts between the hospital and 
the disputing parties expressly excluded any other party from those contracts. Even so, the 
court held that the fact that the contracts however made continued reference to the other non-
signatory, were enough to invoke arbitration against the non-signatory.77   
 
When discussing the interrelatedness between the parties, the court pointed to the contractual 
links between the hospital as the owner, McBro as the construction manager and Triangle as 
the electrical engineer. As the court deemed there to exist a “close relationship of the three 
entities here involved”78 and also taking into account the “close relationship of the alleged 
wrongs to McBro’s contractual duties to perform as construction manager.”79, the requirement 
of intertwinement was met. When the court had established this fact, the arbitration agreement 
between the hospital and McBro could be used to invoke arbitration against the non-
signatory, Triangle. 
 
To comment on the discussion of interrelatedness of the parties in the case, one notes that no 
parent- or sibling connection between the companies or any previous relationship between 
McBro and Triangle existed. The two companies had only worked together on this very 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Stavros Brekoulakis, Third Parties in International Commercial Arbitration (1st edn, Oxford University Press 
2010) 137 
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78 Ibid 343 
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construction. It would not seem to be the ordinary situation where two separate companies 
contracts effects a third company. It thus has to be a regular situation when several companies 
work together on a construction. One could argue that if regard is not taken to the actual 
signatories of the contracts but merely to the links between the companies, as in the case of 
McBro, it could by extension lead to a softer approach on the importance of the actual consent 
of the parties. The implications if regard is not taken of the actual signatories, could be that it 
now is easier for courts to bind non-signatories to arbitration agreements. If two or more 
companies were to work together, the case of McBro could point to a willingness by the 
courts to invoke arbitration between all companies only by reference to two other, separate, 
companies contract and the arbitration agreement existing between them. This could mean 
that on a construction site, if two companies had a contract containing an arbitration clause, a 
dispute that in any way related to this contract (between other parties), could be resolved by 
arbitration instead of litigation. This is however only a theoretical possibility brought forward 
in this thesis and is not the direct implications of McBro. 
 
It could also be held that the result occurring when several contracts exist and applies within a 
construction site without regard for the actual signatures thereof, would widely overstep the 
limits of intertwined estoppel. The basis of the method, as explained above, is the close 
corporate or contractual ties of the companies involved and one could question if this 
requirement really is being upheld when the mere existence of companies working together 
on a construction binds non-signatory companies to arbitration agreements. It seems that the 
scope or limits of intertwined estoppel are being stretched to its limits, or even extended 
beyond them, and one could question of this application of intertwined estoppel ensures the 
predictability of contract law.  
 
To see the continued development of the method of intertwined estoppel an analysis of a case 
finalized ten years later, Sunkist Soft Drinks v Sunkist Growers80, will be made. Here, the 
licensor (Sunkist Growers) of a trademark claimed that Sunkist Soft Drinks together with its 
parent company (Del Monte) had breached the license agreement between Sunkist Growers 
and Sunkist Soft Drinks. The non-signatory Del Monte wanted to compel arbitration with 
basis in an arbitration agreement existing as a clause in the license agreement. The question 
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for the court was by that if this non-signatory parent company could compel arbitration even 
though it had not signed the arbitration agreement.  
 
Sunkist Growers held that as Del Monte never was a party to the license agreement, Sunkist 
Growers never consented to or intended to arbitrate with Del Monte. By stating this, Sunkist 
Growers pointed to the difference in this case opposed to that of McBro. Here, no reference in 
the license agreement is made to Del Monte and no interrelatedness or relationship is seen 
between Del Monte and Sunkist Growers. Despite this fact, the court holds that the fact that 
the non-signatory in the case of McBro were mentioned in the signatories contract, were not 
the primary reason or crucial factor for the judgment. The dominant reason, the court holds, 
was instead that the non-signatory’s claim was derived from the main contract containing the 
arbitration agreement. The court therefore determined that as the claims of Sunkist Growers 
against Del Monte were derived from the license agreement, the arbitration clause in that 
agreement could be used by Del Monte to invoke arbitration.81  
 
One could however argue that the court somewhat contradicted itself when stating, “although 
Sunkist does not rely exclusively on the license agreement to support its claims, each claim 
presumes the existence of such an agreement. We find that each counterclaim maintained by 
Sunkist arises out of and relates directly to the license agreement”82. What this seems to 
indicate is that even if the disputes are not directly derived from the agreement containing the 
arbitration clause, the claims are arbitrable if they relate to the license agreement. As the court 
stated that the claims in the case were intimately founded in and intertwined with the license 
agreement, and that there existed an integral relationship between the licensee and the 
licensee’s parent company, intertwined estoppel could be used to invoke arbitration.83  
 
The court here seems to state that it is actually not important if the non-signatory is a 
signatory to the contract or not. Merely the fact that the dispute arises from the main contract 
can bind a third party. The discussion did not concern if the third party actually had agreed to 
arbitrate, but if the dispute was connected to the other companies’ contract. This could point 
towards the direction that the court here partly abandons the consent requirement and are 
moving towards a jurisdictional based approach to arbitration. This would mean that the basis 	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for arbitration, the cornerstone of consent, now is starting to evolve into an approach where 
the jurisdiction is derived not from consent but from analyzing the dispute at hand and 
defying the parties related to this dispute. The basis would not, as originally intended, be to 
analyze if consent to arbitrate is at hand but instead to define the parties only by viewing the 
dispute and the parties connected to it, even if not all are signatories to the arbitration 
agreement. 
 
In the cases of McBro and Sunkist the question in both cases was if the non-signatory could 
invoke arbitration against a signatory. A different conclusion was reached when a signatory to 
an arbitration clause wanted to invoke arbitration against a non-signatory. In the case of 
Thomson-CFS v American Arbitration Association 84  the court first emphasized the 
importance of remaining within the boundaries of contract- and agency law when joining non-
signatories. The question in the case was if the company of Thomson could have arbitration 
invoked against it, due to the working agreement between the company earlier acquired by 
Thomson (Rediffusion) and E&S, or not. E&S first, with reference to equitable estoppel, held 
that as Thomson derived an indirect benefit from the working agreement, it should be deemed 
to arbitrate. The court rejected that claim on the basis that only direct benefits could invoke 
equitable estoppel.  
 
When then discussing intertwined estoppel, the court held that as the non-signatory is the one 
towards which the arbitration proceedings is invoked, caution needs to be taken. The court 
held that the nature of arbitration makes this distinction important i.e. it is important if it is a 
non-signatory or a signatory that is to become bound to the agreement. It would seem as if the 
court was of the opinion that it should be more difficult to invoke arbitration against a non-
signatory than a signatory. The court stated that when speaking of Thomson, a non-signatory 
in this case, it cannot be estopped from denying the existence of an arbitration agreement as 
such an agreement does not exist. In reference to this statement, the court held in regard to 
binding Thomson as a non-signatory that it ”dilutes the safeguards afforded to a non-signatory 
by the ordinary principles of contract and agency”85. This would point towards a desire of a 
more restricted view on binding non-signatories with emphasis on the importance of having 
the basis in contract- and agency law, at least when it comes to joining a non-signatory.  
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A difference in attitude can thereby be seen, at least in the case of Thomson, regarding the 
invocation of arbitration agreements against a non-signatory in contrast to a signatory. One 
could argue that such a difference may be unnecessary and that the safeguards existing when 
interpreting in accordance with contract- and agency law should cover all companies on the 
market, signatories or not. The reason for taking special notice and care of the non-signatory 
is evident but one could argue that the basis of arbitration, consent, always should be present, 
signatory or not. 
 
3.3	  Findings	  with	  regard	  to	  Arbitral	  Estoppel	  
As can be seen in regard to these landmark cases, a big evolvement especially concerning the 
intertwined method of estoppel has taken place. The methods, that started as exceptions to the 
rule of consent, has now become a rule of presumption. A presumption that now holds that 
implied consent is at hand when certain requirements between the parties or non-parties exist. 
One can wonder if this were the intentions of the courts in the earlier cases as single 
sentences, sometimes drawn from its context, has been used to justify the continued 
development of the methods. As the courts no longer seem to specifically discuss if consent is 
at hand, but instead merely refers to the method of intertwined estoppel to invoke arbitration, 
the method has become an accepted fact. This, even if the application of the method could be 
held to contravene the requirement of consent. 
 
The method of equitable estoppel has since years back been an accepted and widely used part 
of American contract law. The intertwined method has however developed within the 
boundaries of international commercial arbitration and it seems as if this method has started 
to get questioned by the very same courts that invented it. 
 
As no formal rules in international commercial arbitration regulate the area of estoppel, the 
frequent usage of the method may have extended the boundaries of arbitration, especially 
when it comes to the intertwined method of estoppel, which might no longer be in line with 
the rules of arbitration. The final word about this method has however yet not been said, but 
one can ponder over the effects it will have on the enforcement of the subsequent awards 
throughout the world as most countries does not accept the method of estoppel in their 
jurisdictions. Chapter 5 will provide an analysis regarding this matter.   	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4	  The	  Group	  of	  Companies	  Doctrine	  
As previously stated, this thesis will also include an analysis regarding one additional method 
of binding non-signatories to arbitration agreements, the group of companies doctrine. This 
will also be done through landmark cases on the area. 
 
4.1	  The	  Group	  of	  Companies	  Doctrine	  in	  Theory	  
The group of companies doctrine is the method where courts or tribunals can bind a non-
signatory on the basis of that company’s strings to, or parent/sibling relationship with, another 
company. In short, the result is that the court or tribune infers common intention of the parties 
on the basis of the corporate structure and the active involvement of the non-signatory. This 
involvement is for example negotiation, performance, or termination of the contract 
containing the arbitration agreement.86  
 
The initial intention when the doctrine was developed in France was, as we will see, that 
when dominant parent companies take active part in for example the negotiation of a 
subsidiary’s contract, over which subsidiary it has absolute control, it should become bound 
to the arbitration agreement existing within that contract. If the parent has such absolute 
control over the subsidiary and works for the contracts creation, it should be seen as a party to 
the agreement. This method by that targets dominant companies in corporate groups. The 
signatory and non-signatory have to be members of the same corporate group and also have 
strong administrative, executive, and/or financial links for the doctrine to apply.87 It is not 
only that the companies belong to the same economic reality that play a role in determining 
the scope of the companies’ closeness, other factors such as if they share financial or human 
resources, trademarks, assets, ownership titles, shares the same office or premises etc. points 
in the direction of the existence of close corporate ties.88  
 
To sum up, the requirements for the application of this method is that the non-signatory 
company belongs to the same group of companies as one of the signatories to the arbitration 
agreement. Furthermore, the non-signatory company has to take active part in the negotiation, 
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performance, or termination of the contract containing the arbitration clause. By fulfilling 
these requirements the idea is that it shows the common intentions of the parties to be bound 
by the arbitration agreement. 89 This common intention is a question of if the other signatory 
(not part of the group of companies) believed that the non-signatory was in fact a party to the 
contract, even though it hadn’t signed it.90.  
 
This method of binding non-signatories is, as of today, the method that is the basis for far 
most controversy throughout the world. Some scholars have even held the method to be non-
existing.91 The reason for this controversy is, according to scholars, that it is clear that this 
doctrine is used by the courts or arbitral tribunals to be able to extend the arbitration 
agreement outside of the actual signatories to the contract.92 The method is also controversial 
in regard to one dominant principle of contract law, which states that an agreement signed by 
one company within a group of companies, only is binding upon that company. If a company 
within a group of companies is not acting within the scope of traditional contract law 
principles (i.e. through an agreement about agency or representation) to bind other companies 
in the same corporate group, the parent or siblings to that company will never be bound by 
that contract. The same contract principle should apply to arbitration agreements.93 As the 
method of group of companies doctrine is intended to bind non-signatories without these 
agency or representation being present, it has led to big controversy. 
 
4.2	  The	  Group	  of	  Companies	  Doctrine	  in	  Practice	  
4.2.1	  The	  Requirements	  of	  the	  Group	  of	  Companies	  Doctrine	  Explained	  
The three requirements seen above will now be explained, but first an introduction of how the 
doctrine came into existence.  
 
When discussing the method’s application in practice, a statement from 1987 and the Paris 
Court of Appeals states the main point regarding the non-signatory issue: “The law of 
arbitration, based on the consensual nature of the arbitration clause, does not allow to extend 	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to third parties, foreign to the contract […]”94 What then followed is with regard to that 
statement quite peculiar. 
 
It all began with the case of Dow Chemical v Isover Saint Gobain95 where the company 
Isover Saint Gobain (Isover) had entered into different contracts with various siblings of the 
Dow Group. A dispute arose and Isover brought up several claims relating to faults in the 
products Isover were to distribute. The Dow Chemical Group wanted to invoke arbitration to 
settle the dispute, this with reference to an arbitration clause in a distribution agreement 
signed by Isover and one of the siblings in the Dow Group. It is for the following discussion 
important to note that the contract that contained the arbitration clause made specific 
reference to other companies of the Dow Group in that way that it stated that any of those 
companies could deliver goods to Isover. The question for the tribune in the case was if they 
had jurisdiction over all of the companies concerned or not.  
 
For the tribune to tackle this question they first stated that despite the fact that the subsidiary 
companies had not signed the relevant contract or arbitration agreement, nor worked for the 
contracts fulfillment, the entire group should be seen as a whole as it was a part of the same 
economic reality96. They also established that the Dow Chemical Company, the parent of the 
group, had absolute control over the subsidiary companies and the tribune therefore held that 
it had jurisdiction to hear all four Dow-companies claims based on the arbitration clause only 
signed by one of the siblings.97  
 
The reasons for binding the non-signatory siblings were several. The court stated: 
 
Considering that it is indisputable – and in fact not disputed – that Dow 
Chemical Company has and exercises absolute control over its subsidiaries 
having either signed the relevant contracts or, like Dow Chemical France [one 
of the subsidiary companies], effectively and individually participated in their 
conclusion, their performance, and their termination” [… and] “irrespective of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 O.I.A.E.T.I. v SOFIDIF et O.E.A.I. S.E.R.U., EURODIF et C.E.A 1987 rev arb 359 (Paris Cour d’appel, 
judgement of 19 December 1986) 
95 ICC case no 4131 of 1982, Dow Chemical France et al v Isover Saint Gobain (1984) 9 YBCA 131 
96 James M Hosking, ’The Third Party Non-Signatory’s Ability to Compel International Commercial Arbitration: 
Doing Justice without Destroying Consent’ (2004) 4 Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal 469, 483 
97 Andrew Tweeddale, Keren Tweeddale, Arbitration of Commercial Disputes: International and English Law 
and Practice (1st edn, Oxford University Press 2005) 161 
	  26	  
the distinct juridical identity of each of its members, a group of companies 
constitutes one and the same economic reality of which the arbitral tribunal 
should take account when it rules on its own jurisdiction […]”98  
 
The tribune by that determined that it had jurisdiction over all of the companies in the Dow 
Group and it based its decision on the fact that the parent exercised absolute control over the 
subsidiaries and had been involved in all the contracts concerned. Even though the companies 
were separate from each other on paper, the tribune held that in practice so was not the case 
and resumed jurisdiction over all companies. 
 
Relating this decision to the requirement of finding the common intention of the parties, 
binding all the companies of the Dow Group would be acceptable if Isover was not clear in 
regard to which of the companies it had dealt with at different points in time. If the same 
people within the Dow Group would have acted in accordance with the contracts and it was 
uncertain what company those people represented, it would somewhat justify that implied 
consent was at hand. This for the reason that if Isover were to accept the delivery of goods 
from all of the subsidiaries at different times, it would show that all companies were aware of 
the distribution agreement containing the arbitration clause. As all subsidiaries performed in 
accordance with the distribution contract, implied consent through this conduct could be 
present and show the common intentions of the parties to become bound by the distribution 
agreement. In this award however, there was no explicit reference to these continued 
deliveries as baseis for implied consent or justification for the same. A fact that one could 
argue is a deficiency in regard to the requirement of consent.  
 
The tribune additionally expanded their reasoning further and may have went way beyond the 
scope of arbitration when they stated, “it is neither sensible nor practical to exclude [from the 
arbitral jurisdiction] the claims of companies who have an interest in the venture and who are 
members of the same corporate family”99. This is of course true but is not in line with the 
basis of arbitration. It would instead point towards a jurisdictional approach on jurisdiction 
when the dispute is the center of attention, not the consent from the parties to be bound by the 
arbitration agreement. A jurisdictional approach might be the more practical and efficient 
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mean to deal with these types of questions, however no justification to do so is found in the 
regulations of international commercial arbitration. 
 
The also required close relationship between the companies was discussed in the case of 
Astra Oil Co Inc. v Rover Navigation Ltd100. Here, the question was if Astra Oil Co Inc. 
(Astra), the non-signatory to a charter party containing an arbitration clause, could invoke 
arbitration against one of the signatories, Rover Navigation Ltd (Rover). The charter party 
was originally signed by Astra’s subsidiary, Astra Oil Trading NV (AOT) and Rover but as 
Astra and AOT both had acted throughout the entire performance of the contract as being 
parties to the contract and with regard to the close ties between Astra and AOT, Astra could 
invoke arbitration. Even though AOT formally had signed it, Astra was both the owner of 
AOT and the holder of the bill of lading.101 Rover had also treated Astra as if it were a 
signatory to the charter party by accepting instructions from Astra during the trip. This, the 
court stated, was enough to find the common intention by all of the parties to become bound 
by the arbitration agreement within the charter party. 
 
With regard to the other requirement, that the non-signatory need to take active part in the 
contract, the ICC award no 6519102 is a good example. Here, Mr. X and Company Y entered 
into a contract containing an arbitration clause with the purpose that Mr. X and Company Y 
were to transfer their shares in different companies to Company XB. Mr. X then transferred 
his shares of the companies XC and XD but when doing so, Company Y withdrew from the 
contract. Mr. X, together with company XB, XC and XD then tried to invoke arbitration 
against Company Y and claimed damages for breach of contract. The question for the tribune 
was by that if all four entities (Group X) could proceed with arbitration steaming from the 
contract between Mr. X and Company Y and it was stated: 
 
As things stand, the arbitration clause can only be applied to the companies of 
group [X] which did effectively take part in the negotiations which led to the 
signature of the Protocol or which are directly concerned by it, to the exclusion 
of those which were nothing but instruments of a financial transaction between 
the hands of a majority shareholder. 	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It was decided that only Mr. X and Company XB within the group were so related to the 
contract that they could invoke arbitration. The case by that clarified that only those 
companies taking active part in the negotiation, conclusion or termination of the contract 
containing the arbitration agreement or that are directly concerned by it, can by reference to 
conduct become parties to the agreement and invoke arbitration. Those companies of the 
group that did not take this active part in the contract, i.e. Companies XC & XD, which were 
only being transferred to Company XB, could not proceed with arbitration. 
 
This section has in short explained the three initial requirements for applying the method of 
group of companies in international arbitration and so far, the requirement of the companies 
taking active part in the contract concerned is being upheld. The application of this 
requirement will however change.  
 
4.2.2	  The	  Continued	  Development	  of	  the	  Group	  of	  Companies	  Doctrine	  
For a different take on the subject of the group of companies doctrine, the ICC Case No 
5103103 is an interesting example. The tribunal here stated, “the security of international 
commercial relations requires that account should be taken of its economic reality and that all 
the companies of the group should be held liable one for all and all for one for the debts of 
which they either directly or indirectly have profited at this occasion”104. This reasoning 
clearly departs from the previously stated rule of finding the common intention of the parties, 
a rule that is considered as being “the flagship and fundamental prerequisite of the group of 
companies doctrine”.105  
 
This reasoning would also defeat the purpose of having separate companies in a corporate 
group. As stated in the American case of Sarhank Group v Oracle Corporation106 it holds to 
the importance of having separate companies in corporate groups: 
 
To hold otherwise would defeat the ordinary and customary principles of 
experienced businesspersons. The principal reason corporations form wholly 	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owned foreign subsidiaries are to insulate themselves from liability for the torts 
and contracts of the subsidiary and from the jurisdiction of foreign courts. The 
practice for dealing through a subsidiary is entirely appropriate and essential to 
our nation’s conduct of foreign trade.107 
 
As indicated, it is the normal conduct in today’s business world to separate legal entities 
within the same group from each other. They should not easily be held to each other’s 
contracts or obligations. Not even the parent to its subsidiaries’. The method of group of 
companies is therefore in many jurisdictions, due to this fact, foreign to the views on 
company law. 
 
Furthermore, in Korsnas Marma v Durand Auzias108, the court expanded the view once more. 
It first concluded, in congruence with the ICC award no 6519109, that an arbitration clause 
contained in an international contract has its own validity and effectiveness, which require its 
extension to all parties directly involved in the performance of the contract. It additionally 
held that once it has been established that the parties’ situations and activities allow the court 
to presume that the companies were aware of the existence and the scope of the arbitration 
clause, they could use the arbitration agreement to invoke arbitration even if they were not 
signatories of the contact containing it.110  
 
If all parties concerned by a dispute could become parties to the same arbitration proceeding, 
it would be an efficient mean to solve international disputes. Even so, it is not based in the 
current requirements of arbitration, i.e. consent. If awareness of an arbitration clause were 
enough to bind a non-signatory performing in accordance with the main contract to the 
arbitration agreement, it would seem to be presumed that the party also accepts the clause. 
The signature of, and consent to, the actual arbitration agreement would by that loose its 
importance. This might be a positive result. However, it would not be in line with the current 
rules of arbitration. 
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The discussion in Korsnas was later adopted and used in the case of ABS v Amkor111. The 
dispute concerned a contract containing an arbitration agreement between Alcatel Micro 
Electronics (AME) and Amkor Technology, the first a Belgian company and the latter an 
American. AME sold goods purchased from Amkor to the French company of Alcatel 
Business Systems (ABS).  When problems with the goods arose, AME and ABS sued Amkor 
and its subsidiaries but Amkor wanted the court to refer the case to arbitration. AME and 
ABS once belonged to the same corporate group but had since long before the arising of the 
dispute at hand, been two entirely separate companies. Even so, the court held that both AME 
and ABS were parties to the contract as they both had acted in accordance with it. The court 
held that “the effect of an international arbitration clause extends to parties that are directly 
involved in the performance of the contract and the disputes that may arise out of it”112.  
 
The cases of Korsnas and ABS, one could argue, might have led to an entire new approach to 
the group of companies doctrine. In the case of ABS it was no longer companies within a 
corporate group that were bound to the agreement, but instead two separate companies 
working together as business partners of which only one had signed the arbitration agreement. 
The group of companies in the group of companies doctrine would by that no longer be a 
requirement for the application of the doctrine.  
 
This new view on arbitration clauses was also seen in the case of Compagnie Tunisienne de 
Navigation Cotunav v Comptoir Commercial André113, where two organizations from the 
Tunisian and French governments signed an agreement containing an arbitration clause. A 
third company, Cotunav, was to deliver food as the carrier for the French government. The 
court however held the Cotunav bound to the entire agreement, solely on the fact that they 
took active part in the performance of the contract. Cotunav had taken no part in rest of the 
main contract, besides from the performance, and was neither affiliated with the French 
government. Even considering that, Cotunav were bound by the arbitration clause. The 
reasoning were that “by accepting to intervene in the performance of the contract as carrier 
appointed by one of the parties in the framework of the contract, Cotunav necessarily 
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assumed the obligations defined by the contract […] and accepted its modalities, including 
the arbitration agreement”114.  
 
In the doctrine, it has been held that the Cotunav case has “led to an enlargement of the 
previous case law, since it recognized such tacit acceptance outside of a group of companies. 
Tacit acceptance that results solely from the performance of a contract concluded by other 
parties.”115. This would, as previously indicated, mean that the group of companies has 
expanded to a method that deems it enough that a third party performs in accordance with a 
contract to become bound by the same. The mere knowledge of an arbitration agreement 
could as a result be enough to interpret implied consent from the third party.116  One could 
question this result and the implications it brings. Even if this way of solving the non-
signatory problem could be seen as the most efficient one, the basis of arbitration makes such 
an application impossible.  
 
To further note is that the last case of Cotunav could suggest that even if the awareness of the 
arbitration clause is not at hand, third parties could anyways be bound to arbitration 
agreements. The company in the case was bound to the agreement by merely taking part in 
the performance of the contract. Nothing was stated as to the fact if the company has been 
aware of the arbitration clause. This could not be held for sure but if that would be the case, it 
would extend the scope of the arbitration agreement way beyond what was initially intended. 
Future cases on the area will by that be interesting. 
 
4.3	  Different	  Approaches	  on	  the	  Group	  of	  Companies	  Doctrine	  
As several countries of today have criticized the doctrine, it is for this thesis interesting why 
they have done so.  
 
Switzerland for example has in large refused to invoke arbitration based on the group of 
companies doctrine. This, with the reasoning that the “extension of an arbitration agreement 
to a party which does not appear therein can be envisaged only if it can be established (by any 
means) that such a party was validly represented by one of the other parties – which does not 
result solely from membership in a group of companies – or if there was subsequent 	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ratification or, finally, in the attempt to evade arbitration constitutes an abuse of rights 
allowing a piercing of the corporate veil”117. It would by that seem as if the group of 
companies doctrine would apply outside of the boundaries of Switzerland’s contract law, due 
to the reference made in the quote to the importance of either representation, or that the 
company afterwards explicitly accepted the arbitration clause. It seems to be outside of the 
boundaries to establish that representation is at hand only with based on the fact that the 
company is part of a group of companies.  
 
Furthermore, in England, the group of companies is said to be inconsistent with the principle 
of privity of contract, which states that only the two actual contracting parties to a contract are 
parties to that contract. As explained above, the contract law of England has deep roots in 
case law and it seems as if the courts would be reluctant in changing one of the fundamental 
principles of contract law, i.e. the principle of privity of contract. To take the case of Peterson 
Farms v C&M. Farming118 for example, the view of the group of companies doctrine was 
made clear as the court stated that it does not form a part of English law. It stated that, “where 
an arbitration agreement (or the contract of which it is contained) is subject to English law 
[…] an ICC arbitral tribunal has no jurisdiction to apply the group of companies doctrine”119.  
 
In the U.S. the application of the doctrine has both been accepted and refused. When 
enforcement was sought in the case of Sarhank v Oracle120, where the basis for bringing in a 
non-signatory was the group of companies doctrine, the enforcement was denied. The court 
held that under American law, the only ways of binding a non-signatory was through veil 
piercing, estoppel and incorporation by reference. The court also held that in regard to 
arbitration, the evidence should show an objective intention to arbitrate, which was not seen 
in the case at hand. It also made direct reference to contract- and agency law as the only 
sources in which the basis of binding non-signatories can be found, 121 and the group of 
companies doctrine was not a part of that law. 
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Opposite opinion was however reached in the case of Map Tankers v Mobil Tankers122. Here, 
the court reached a conclusion based on an efficiency approach, and in accordance with that 
stated, “it was not reasonable and practical to prevent a signatory party from including in the 
arbitration the claims of its group of subsidiaries or partners”123. This decision however does 
not seem to reflect the current view. The judgment of Sarhank is more recent and one could 
hold that it therefore overrides the decision of Map Tankers. However, it is possible that the 
efficiency reasons stated in Map Tankers is more in line with the conduct of international 
trade of today. It would still seem as uncertainty regarding this matter exists. 
 
4.4	  Findings	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  Group	  of	  Companies	  Doctrine	  
As indicated, the evolvement of the group of companies doctrine has moved fast. The 
doctrine has no longer its base in the three requirements first stated. There is today no need 
for a parent company to have absolute control over its subsidiaries and, as a consequence, be 
seen as the actual signatory to the contact. Instead, we have seen a shift towards a usage of the 
doctrine extending beyond the contract law of several jurisdictions of today when it now is 
enough that a third party performs in accordance with a contract to become bound by not only 
that, but also by the arbitration agreement. As arbitration is based on consent, this fact is an 
obvious issue. To bind a third party only on the basis of its role as a carrier, as in the case of 
Cotunav, is not in line with the fundamental principles of arbitration nor most contract laws 
throughout the world. The intention to arbitrate is not present, which is a major problem.  
 
This raises questions not only in regard to the fact that consent, the cornerstone of arbitration, 
might no longer present but also towards the separability principle, which states that the 
arbitration agreement is an entire separate contract which can be upheld even if the main 
agreement is deemed void. Furthermore, questions as to the possibilities of the enforcement of 
an award based on this doctrine arise. These questions will be further developed and 
discussed below. 	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5	  Enforcement	  Issues	  
As indicated in chapters 3 and 4, inconsistencies between different countries use, and level of 
acceptance, of arbitral estoppel and group of companies doctrine can be seen. When such 
inconsistencies appear, it affects the parties to the dispute. On one hand, if a party wants to 
invoke arbitration against a non-signatory through either arbitral estoppel or group of 
companies doctrine, it can of course only be done when applying those laws that accept the 
methods. For example, to be relatively sure that a parent company, not signatory to the 
arbitration agreement, still can take part in the arbitration proceedings, French law in this case 
needs to be the applicable one. The applicable law is, as explained in para 2.2 of this thesis, 
determined either by the parties expressed choice of law, or otherwise by the law applicable to 
the substantive terms of the main agreement.124 It is therefore important as a party to a dispute 
to know which law that will apply to the non-signatory problem. This problem will not be 
discussed further, however it should be noted that when having these vast differences in the 
applicability of the methods, problems with the predictability of arbitration arises.  
 
On the other hand, and more interesting to this thesis, problems can arise when the law used 
to finalize an award is not coherent with the law of the jurisdiction of enforcement. If for 
example the intertwined version of estoppel has been used to bind a non-signatory to an 
arbitration agreement and an award in the case has been finalized, problems when one of the 
parties wants to enforce this award in another jurisdiction can arise. If this country of 
enforcement does not accept the method of intertwined estoppel, it is possible that the 
enforcement of the award is refused. This of course causes serious problems for the party 
wanting to enforce the award as the loosing party might have all its assets in the country of 
enforcement. It is by that almost impossible to actually obtain a result from the award, making 
the arbitration proceeding meaningless and expensive. 
 
Article V(2) of the New York Convention deals with the issue of enforcement. It states: 
 
Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if the 
competent authority in the country where recognition and enforcement is 
sought finds that: 
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(a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by 
arbitration under the law of that country. 
 
It is with reference to this article that enforcement can be refused if the country of 
enforcement does not find the applied method as being part of their national law. 
 
One of the leading cases on this area is the case of Dallah v Pakistan125, where the English 
court refused to enforce a French award. The background of the case was Dallah’s 
arrangement with the Pakistan government that stated that Dallah was to purchase land in 
Mecca to build houses for pilgrims from Pakistan. The government in turn established a trust, 
which entered into an agreement with Dallah. The agreement contained an arbitration clause 
and when a dispute arose concerning this contract, Dallah initiated arbitration proceedings 
against the Pakistan government. The government however held that it was not party to the 
arbitration agreement, as it at no time had signed it. Even so, the arbitral tribune held that 
international general principles and usages reflect a fundamental requirement in international 
trade for justice and fairness and with regard to that fact arbitration could be invoked. The fact 
that the Pakistan government were involved in the negotiation of the contract led to the 
presumption that common intention of the parties existed, and the government was deemed a 
party to the agreement.126 
 
When the award was to be enforced in England however, the English court refused. The basis 
for refusing was that the doctrine applied in France formed no part of English law. The 
government of Pakistan was, according to the English court, not a party to the arbitration 
agreement in the first place and the award could not be enforced. The English court put 
emphasis on the fact that the government could not be seen as a signatory to the arbitration 
agreement on the mere fact that it had created the trust, which in turn entered into the 
agreement. The creation of the trust was instead seen as a way of distancing itself from the 
agreement and it was therefore not the common intention of the parties that all three entities 
(including the government) were parties to the agreement. 
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Another example is the American case of Sarhank127, where a problem again arose regarding 
the enforcement of an award. The court here with reference to Article V(2) held that it was 
not required to enforce an agreement if its subject matter was not capable of arbitration in the 
U.S. It, as previously stated, held that the basis of joining the non-signatory i.e. the group of 
companies doctrine, was not part of American law. It held that an agreement to arbitrate had 
to be made voluntarily, something that was not proved in the case. As the arbitration 
agreement was signed by Oracle Systems and Sarhank, and not by Oracle (or even with 
reference to Oracle), the agreement could not prove a clear and unmistakable intent by Oracle 
to arbitrate and the enforcement of the same was refused. The court held that with reference to 
Article V(2) it was not bound by the Egyptian court’s decision in regard to the arbitrability of 
the dispute. As the decision did not form a part of American contract law and implied- or 
common consent could not be established in regard to the non-signatory, Oracle, the 
American court were entitled to question that decision and by that refuse enforcement of the 
award. 
 
From these decisions it is clear that there exists uncertainty and unpredictability in 
international commercial arbitration today. When France on one hand has an open-minded 
view on joining non-signatories, several other jurisdictions on the other, do not.128 Problems 
relating to these differences arise when the dispute is international and needs to be enforced in 
another country than from which it was resolved. It therefore seems unwise to rely on the 
methods above for presuming consent, especially with regard to the group of companies 
doctrine. As the effects of the following enforcement is hard to predict, caution needs to be 
taken when basing an argument on any of these methods to bind a non-signatory. 	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6	  Consent	  
As the methods of arbitral estoppel and group of companies doctrine now has been explained, 
analyzed, and exemplified, the main question regarding these methods is the one concerning 
consent. As the methods are formed in such a way to presume implied- or common consent of 
the parties, this thesis will now discuss the matter of consent in relation to the two methods. It 
will also analyze consent in regard to the separability principle and the ‘in writing’ 
requirement, previously explained in para 2.3.1 and 2.4 of this thesis. The discussion will 
concern both common and civil law as the previous cases are derived from both these areas. 
 
Consent has been the basis of contract law since forever.129 The ability to enter into contracts 
only effective to the parties that has consented to it, makes for security and predictability. As 
one can rely on a contract he has consented to, it strengthens the autonomy of the individual 
and the freedom of contract. One is free to agree or to not agree, making for a safe contract 
environment. If consent was not a factor in contract law, this freedom and individual 
autonomy would not mean much at all.130 
 
In its most basic form, consent should be made explicitly. It should be clear from the 
wordings of the contract what the parties intentions, when entering into the contract, were. 
However, this is not likely to be the case, not everything can be put into words. As consent is 
not always found in its basic form, the more interesting discussion will be about implied 
consent. It can be found in most legal systems around the world and is accepted in various 
degrees by conduct, non-explicit declarations, or the formal execution of an agreement. This 
basic way of interpreting a contract is also applicable to arbitration agreements. The question 
in regard to implied consent and binding non-signatories should be: Did the parties intend to 
also bind the non-signatory to the contract?131  
 
Allowing third parties to arbitrate is however good for commercial, procedural, and equity 
reasons. It is efficient as the tribunal can decide over several parties in the same dispute and it 
is both cost and time efficient. Holding too strongly to the requirement of consent has been 
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held to lead to multiple theoretical and practical problems and inconsistencies.132 It is possible 
that entities important to a dispute, if an ease of the consent requirement is not made, would 
be left outside the dispute due to inconsistent evidence of consent.133 It has further been held 
that the requirement of consent may perhaps no longer be in line with the commercial reality 
of today. It might have outgrown the current contractual doctrine, where efficiency is key.134   
 
An analysis of implied consent will follow in regard to arbitral estoppel and the group of 
companies doctrine. The purpose is to analyze where the state of consent is at today and how 
well the two methods are in line with that state. 
 
6.1	  Contract	  Interpretation	  
The only way a court can bind a non-signatory to an arbitration agreement is by interpreting 
who is party to the agreement within the scope of contract law.135 Important to note is that 
there is no specific rule that allow courts or arbitral tribunals to extend arbitration agreements 
outside of what has been agreed. The ordinary principles for contract interpretation, as used 
for any other contract, should be applied. A lesser degree of consent than is required for 
regular contracts is therefore not acceptable.136 This interpretation should always have the 
result that third parties in stricto sensu should be excluded from the arbitration proceedings.137  
 
With regard to interpretation, the basis in all countries is finding the parties true intentions 
when entering into the relevant contract.138 Differences in the way this is applied is however 
seen worldwide. In England for example, the view is an objective one as they only take into 
account the appearance of the contract.139 What this means is that the actual intentions or 
thoughts of the parties, i.e. subjectivism, are not taken into consideration. It is only the parties’ 
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are considered. That is, what the clause reasonably would mean to a person with all the 
background information the day the contract was signed and what can be found in regard to 
the feelings coming out from the contract. 140 
 
With that said, England takes a classical position also when interpreting arbitration 
agreements. The parties need to have undertaken positive acts that clearly establish the non-
signatories’ intent to be bound by the agreement. The original parties also have to accept, or it 
has to be clear by the circumstances that they accept, the third party being joined to the 
arbitration agreement.141 
 
The English courts rarely take into account the pre-contractual discussions or agreements, for 
example the negotiation documents or letters of intent, when interpreting contracts.142 It is 
important in English law to distinguish the contract from the negotiations, which is not a legal 
promise and should therefore not be taken into consideration.143 Interpretation with regard to 
these pre-documents only applies in exceptional cases.144   
 
In the U.S. however, it is not only the objective intentions that can be taken into account when 
interpreting a contract, even subjective ones are important. Such subjective intentions are, 
even though not expressed in the contract, for example the actual or mental intentions of the 
parties at the time of contract. This with one restriction though, which is the non-acceptance 
of parole evidence. A rule also seen in England that restricts extrinsic evidence that 
contradicts the written contract from being taken into account. What this means is if the pre-
documents would contradict a term in the contract, the pre-document cannot be used as 
evidence. The rationale for this is that if this document was such an important part in regard 
to interpreting and understanding the contract, it should have been included in the contract in 
the first place. As the parties have agreed to leave it out, it cannot be used.145  
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In common law countries, and in England especially, certain goals sometimes weigh more 
heavily than contractual freedom. One example is the importance of fostering the security of 
transactions, which means to hold parties to their manifested intentions when it is fair to do 
so. It is also important that the parties can rely on a contract, clear as to the rights, duties, and 
powers resulting from the terms in it.146  
 
In civil law countries the dominant principle is, as in the U.S., the subjective one. Relating 
this to the drafting of legislation, the reasoning behind, and pre-documents drafted before, the 
legislation are sources that can be used as interpretation.147 This view is also taken in regard 
to contract interpretation, as the goal is to find the parties true intentions when entering into 
the contract. When doing so, all documentation both before and after the conclusion of the 
contract can be used to achieve this goal. Not only the parties’ words are examined, but also 
the circumstances at hand, for example the conduct of the parties.148 
 
In reference to arbitration, France for example overlooks the in para 2.4 explained principle of 
separability as they not only interpret the arbitration agreement to find implied consent, but 
also looks at the entire contract it is a part of. This, showing a difference in regard to the U.S., 
where the arbitration agreement in itself is the place to look for implied consent. However, an 
overlook to the entire contract can, in exceptional cases, be made.149 
 
This would point to the conclusion that the U.S. has placed itself somewhere between the 
English approach to contract interpretation and the one of the civil law countries. The U.S. 
still has one leg standing firmly in the English system, as the non-acceptance of parole 
evidence indicates the importance of contract, but also has one leg in the civil law system as it 
focuses more on the subjective intentions of the parties.  
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6.2	  Implied	  Consent	  with	  regard	  to	  Arbitral	  Estoppel	  and	  Group	  of	  Companies	  
Doctrine	  
6.2.1	  Arbitral	  Estoppel	  and	  Implied	  Consent	  
When first comes to the equitable estoppel, the basis for binding a non-signatory to a contract 
is, as previously stated, that the non-signatory gets such benefits from the contract that it 
would be highly unfair if the burdens of the contract could not effect him. If it is clear from 
the circumstances that the non-signatory from the beginning acted in accordance with the 
contract and benefitted from the same150, and then sued a party to the contract with basis in 
that contract, it seems obvious that the signatory instead could invoke arbitration against him. 
As the non-signatory has acted in accordance with, and sued with basis in, that contract it 
would suggest that the non-signatory has impliedly consented to the same, even though he 
formally had not signed it. The crucial point in finding the non-signatory bound is the fact that 
he is using the contract as the basis for suing the other party. As the contract has an arbitration 
agreement contained in it, the signatory should instead be able to use this to invoke 
arbitration. If the non-signatory has relied on the rest of the contract, that clause cannot be 
avoided. Objective intention with regard to the contract would by that be at hand.151 As the 
method of equitable estoppel also forms part of U.S. law, the requirement that the signatories 
is bound to the arbitration agreements with basis in contract law would seem to be upheld.  
 
It has been held in regard to the intertwined method of estoppel that the importance of consent 
has “been practically diminished, and even on some occasions overlooked”152. The focus 
should always be on finding consent to arbitrate from the parties, something that not always 
seem to be the focus of attention when the method is being applied. It has also been held that 
a more rigorous legal analysis by using traditional principles of contract- and agency law 
needs to be undertaken in these cases.153  There has to be focus on finding consent within the 
scope of contract law. Often both of the requirements for applying intertwined estoppel, i.e. 
the intertwinement of the dispute with the contract and the contractual or corporate link 
between the non-signatory and the signatory, has not been fulfilled. It today seems to be 
enough that the signatory and non-signatory are closely related to find implied consent from 
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the parties.154  As seen in chapter 3, it is sometimes even enough that the companies merely 
work on the same construction site. 
 
To exemplify these opinions, in the case of Choctaw155, the intertwined method of estoppel 
was used. The background of the dispute was a construction contract between Choctaw and 
the company Bechtel. In regard to this contract, a surety bond was issued by the American 
Home Assurance Company (AHA, the non-signatory) to secure the performance of the 
construction contract. An arbitration agreement was incorporated in the construction contract 
but non were to be found in the surety bond. A dispute arose between Choctaw and Bechtel 
and arbitration proceedings commenced. Due to this fact, AHA wanted to join the arbitration 
proceedings. The court held that such participation by the non-signatory was possible by 
reference to the method of intertwined estoppel. The reason was that “the Bond could hardly 
be more closely bound to the dispute now in arbitration between Choctaw and Bechtel under 
the construction contract”156. The deciding factor was the interrelatedness between the parties 
and their contracts.157 It seems as if no focus was on the question of consent, it was quietly 
presumed.  
 
With this example in mind, it seems as the discussion of binding a non-signatory is no longer 
a discussion about consent. It seems that as long as the courts can find the requirements for 
the estoppel method present, that alone is enough to bind non-signatories to arbitration 
agreements. It seems that the method is now so widely recognized that the need for discussing 
consent with basis in contract law is not necessary. The method of intertwined estoppel, if 
applicable, presumes that consent is at hand without further analysis. That kind of 
presumption of consent might lead to an unacceptable compromise of the requirement of 
consent.158 
 
It has additionally been held that these types of judgments seen in the Choctaw case rely more 
on the consideration of equity and efficiency, than on actually analyzing the contract with 
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regard to contract law. The arguments of equity and efficiency however do not support the 
extension of arbitration agreements, as they do not have their basis in consent.159 
 
If this would be the case, that the mere applicability of the intertwined method of estoppel is 
enough to bind non-signatories, it would mean that the non-signatory by that is estopped from 
denying the existence of an arbitration clause. An interesting view brought up relating to that 
fact is that the non-signatory cannot be estopped from denying the existence of an arbitration 
clause, because he never signed a contract where such a clause existed.160  
 
6.2.2	  Group	  of	  Companies	  Doctrine	  and	  Implied	  Consent	  
As regarding the group of companies doctrine, the important requirement for the application 
of the method was from the beginning that the non-signatories of the group of companies had 
absolute control over its subsidiaries and took active part in the negotiation, performance, or 
termination of the contract containing the arbitration clause. The courts would then discuss 
this issue by referring to the common intention of all the companies.161 If all companies were 
to have worked together in accordance with a contract, and at the same time it was not clear 
which company a certain party had dealt with at different times, implied consent through 
conduct could be confirmed. It was also important that the parent company had such influence 
over its subsidiary that the parent in fact should be viewed as the right party to the contract. 
This, as it had been the party most dedicated to the contracts creation and the subsidiary only 
was the signatory on paper. This was, as previously stated, the initial view and justification 
for the group of companies doctrine. 
 
The acceptance is by that a tacit one and results either from the conduct when the contract 
was being negotiated, or from the acts following, for example the supervision of operations or 
by the parent company taking an active role in the performance in accordance with the 
contract.162 It has now been held that, at least in France, reference to this type of tacit 
acceptance is no longer made. Instead it is presumed that the non-signatory wants to be bound 
by the entire agreement when he, by conduct, is acting in accordance with the contract.163 
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It can be difficult when it comes to implied consent to draw the line between consent based on 
conduct, and the mere awareness of a specific fact. The latter, which has been held, should not 
bind a non-signatory to an arbitration clause. 164 Another opinion raised concerns the fact that 
even if a smaller involvement in a contract usually does not bind a non-signatory to the 
arbitration therein, it has happened. However, involvement to a larger extent usually implies 
consent.165 Of course, when it is the third party that has invoked arbitration or has failed to 
object to an arbitration invocation, this conduct is seen as evidence of implied consent.166 If 
the third party however is the one against whom the invocation is done, more involvement 
from this third party would seem to be needed to prove that consent is at hand. The mere 
awareness of the arbitration clause should not be deemed enough.  
 
In the French case of Korsnas Marma v Durand-Auzias167 for example, the court held that 
when a non-signatory was involved with the performance of a contract, the mere awareness of 
the existence of the arbitration clause could make the non-signatory a party to the same. It 
was presumed that the party also accepted the clause only by its awareness of it. Furthermore, 
in the case of ABS & Amkor168, the non-signatory was deemed to arbitrate even though no 
corporate links were found between the companies. The only justification for joining the non-
signatory to the dispute was not through consent, which could be indicated by the fact that the 
parent company actually was the real signatory to the contract, but through the conduct of 
separate entities acting in accordance with the contract.  
 
This conclusion of the mere awareness of an arbitration clause within another contract, signed 
by completely different entities, cannot in any way be in line with the requirement of consent. 
The view taken in ABS somewhat changed the view that consent was the basis of arbitration. 
This as the French court stated that the arbitration agreements had autonomous validity and 
effectiveness. They stated that if a non-signatory was aware of an arbitration clause, even if it 
was not part of a group of companies, the mere fact that he acted in accordance with a 
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contract, it accepted the workings not only of the contract but of the arbitration agreement as 
well.169  
 
In regard to the group of companies doctrine one view is that the initial way to find implied 
consent through companies participation in the negotiation, performance, or termination of 
the contract only was an indication of the consent to arbitrate, something that has changed. 
The method has now evolved into a state where the mere knowledge of the arbitration clause 
constitutes acceptance thereof.170 The method is of course part of French law, but could not be 
held to form part of international commercial arbitration as consent is neither discussed in the 
group of companies cases or in most seems not to exist at all. 
 
It could be held that if the mere awareness is enough to bind a non-signatory, that non-
signatory’s awareness and acceptance of the agreement should actually be put into the 
agreement. In some cases, the non-signatory deliberately might not have signed such an 
agreement even though being aware of its existence. By not signing the contract, it could 
instead be seen as evidence in the opposite direction, and that the non-signatory might just not 
have wanted to be a part of the arbitration agreement. 
 
6.2.3	  Findings	  with	  regard	  to	  Consent	  in	  Arbitral	  Estoppel	  and	  Group	  of	  Companies	  
Doctrine	  
As indicated above, the initial view that consent only can be established through a group of 
companies common intention to be bound by the contract has changed. Here, the view taken 
was that if a group of companies all took part in the negotiations, performance, or termination 
of the contract, and they all had the intentions to be bound by that contract (or if that couldn’t 
be established, at least that they formed a part of a economic reality and all participated in the 
contract), all companies in that group was seen as one and implied consent was then 
presumed. The basis for this was those companies’ acts in accordance with that specific 
contract, and one could argue that to be a legitimate way to stop involved companies, that 
belong to the same economic system, from avoiding the burdens of a contract to which they 
have taken substantial part. This way of invoking arbitration against a group of companies so 
related to the dispute, that it is clear that more than the signatory of that contract intended to 
be bound by it, is perhaps a necessary way to uphold justice in the system of arbitration. 	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Current case law instead points to the direction that merely tacit or presumed acceptance 
should be enough to bind a third party. This would extend the arbitration clause in a much 
broader sense than seems to have been initially intended. One can never escape the fact that 
arbitration has its basis in consent. It therefore has to be the goal to find that consent in the 
party’s conduct or acts. The purpose should not be to try to extend the arbitration agreement 
to other than the signatories with basis in the current dispute at hand, even if effective. The 
view should be to define the consenting parties to the dispute, not to drag companies with 
relation to the dispute into it. The current international law behind arbitration does not allow 
such a view as it can be considered ignorant to the importance of consent, and thereby the 
predictability of arbitration. It therefore seems that the group of companies doctrine is not 
consistent with the requirement of consent. 
 
6.3	  The	  ‘in	  writing’	  Requirement	  and	  Implied	  Consent	  
It is also important to note how the in writing requirement is set in relation to the question of 
consent. As explained earlier, the in writing requirement was from the beginning a 
requirement of signature. Today however, the requirement is still present but has changed into 
a view that the agreement preferably should be able to in some way be evidenced in 
writing.171 In the ICC case no 10758 of 2000172 for example, the court held that when wanting 
to show a non-signatory’s willingness or consent to arbitrate, it must be proved in writing. 
This is however only true when the seat of arbitration requires the agreement to be in writing. 
 
If, on the other hand, the applicable law does not require arbitration agreements to be in 
writing, they can be entered into orally. Today the view on the in writing requirement has 
shifted, and almost all jurisdictions now accept arbitration agreements without basis in 
writing. The center for discussion in courts and arbitral tribunals regarding this fact is 
therefore not if the agreement is signed or evidenced in writing, but if the party has actually 
consented to it or not.173 
 
One view on the subject is that a strict holding on the in writing requirement is hard to justify 
in the expanding context of international trade. It is just not effective. It can however be used 
as evidence. Even if such evidence is not at hand, implied consent can be proven but it has to 	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be clear from the circumstances and evidenced in full. 174  It is, for implied consent to be at 
hand, important that the agreement is interpreted, as previously stated, with regard to well-
established principles and techniques for interpretation. It has been held that consent by 
conduct must be possible, but only if it can be certainly established.175  
 
Another opinion raised concerning consent by conduct in regard to the in writing requirement 
is that “[…] existing form requirements in the New York Convention and the 1985 
UNCITRAL Model Law are unnecessary and instead serve to frustrate commercial parties’ 
legitimate expectations and rights”.176 The provisions, at least relating to this quote, seem 
obsolete. 
 
Also, in regard to the in writing requirement, both the New York Convention and the Model 
Law clearly states that the arbitration agreement is an agreement between the parties177. There 
is no room in that definition to bind other than the parties. This statement as such is in most 
cases not addressed. Some courts and tribunals, that thus has considered the problem, has 
argued that since there is no obligation to actually sign the agreement, third parties can be 
included. This has however been held not to be an acceptable conclusion.178 Even if the in 
writing requirement in its wording is obsolete, the principle steaming from the articles is not. 
It is the parties that should agree to arbitrate. One could therefore argue that the principle 
steaming of this article does not leave room for joining non-signatories. 
 
It seems that this principle is not taken into consideration by the courts and tribunals even 
though some have argued that the form requirements only should apply to the arbitration 
agreement itself, and not to extra-contractual mechanisms through which a third party can 
become bound to the agreement.179 Even if this might be in line with the commercial practice 
of today, it is held not to be in line with the requirements of arbitration. If the articles in the 
New York Convention or Model Law do not deal with extra contractual mechanisms per se, 	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one could argue that the principles found in the two conventions only concerns parties and 
signatories, not leaving room for entities that are not true parties to the agreement. It could 
therefore be said not to be in line with the basis of arbitration to easily bind non-signatories to 
arbitration agreements.  
 
6.4	  The	  Doctrine	  of	  Separability	  and	  Implied	  Consent	  
As previously briefly mentioned, the separability principle is of uttermost importance 
regarding consent. Even if a third party acts in accordance with a contract, that ordinarily only 
means that the party is acting in accordance with the substantive terms of that contract.180 As 
the arbitration agreement is to be seen as a different contract, according to the separability 
principle, the fact that the party is acting in accordance with the main contract should mean 
just that, that he should be bound to the main contract. As the arbitration clause is separate, he 
should not be bound to it only on the merits of acting in accordance with an entirely different 
contract. It should be proven that the party has actually consented to the arbitration agreement 
in itself. This is however, as has been previously indicated, not the view taken by the courts.  
 
With the basis in the performance of the main contract, the courts have bound third parties to 
arbitration agreements. It has been held that the actual intention to arbitrate also has to be 
proven by clear evidence that shows that the party first became aware of the clause and then 
tacitly agreed to it.181 This view was affirmed by the American case of Celanese Corporation 
and Celanese (Nanjing) Chemical Co v The BOC Group Plc182. Two parent companies 
(Celanese AG and BOC Plc) together with their fully owned subsidiaries (Celanese Nanjing 
and BOC Nanjing) entered into a contract that regarded the construction of a power plant. The 
arbitration agreement however was only signed by the subsidiary companies. When the 
Celanese parent and subsidiary sued the BOC Group, BOC instead sought arbitration 
proceedings. The court however refused due to the fact that it was not certain that consent 
from the parent companies existed in regard to the arbitration agreement. The reason for this 
was that even if the parents did know about the arbitration agreement, they for some reason 
did not sign it. The mere knowledge was by that not enough for binding the non-signatories to 
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the agreement.183 This case demonstrates the point made in this part of the thesis, that consent 
not only needs to be found in regard to the main contract, but also specifically in regard to the 
arbitration agreement in itself. For a new party to accept the main contract, or to perform in 
accordance with it, it is according to this case, and as one could argue also according to the 
separability principle, not enough to ensure that he has actually consented to the arbitration 
agreement.  
 
It has further been noted that “it is a party’s implied consent to arbitrate – not to deliver or 
purchase goods- that is decisive.”184. As we have two separate contracts, something more than 
performance in regard to the main contract is by that needed. The implied consent should be 
found in regard to the arbitration agreement and not in regard to the main one. This way of 
applying the separability principle is however not consistent, even if desired, around the 
world.  
 
6.5	  Findings	  with	  regard	  to	  Consent	  
To start with the equitable estoppel, when used in the sense of binding a non-signatory that 
has acted in accordance with the contract, and who is trying to sue one of the signatories with 
that contract as a basis, the use of the method has to be deemed proper. When it comes to this, 
it has been argued that implied consent usually is a factor when the courts tries to bind a non-
signatory “especially when the non-signatory party relies on a direct benefit arising out of the 
substantive terms of the contract, which contains an arbitration clause as well. Reliance of the 
non-signatory on the substantive terms of the contract may implicitly suggest consent to the 
arbitration clause contained therein”185. It is however a problematic application with regard to 
the separability doctrine.  
 
When it comes to the intertwined method of estoppel, as can be seen through the presented 
case law in this thesis, it is now questionable if the requirement of consent is really fulfilled. 
As the method has developed from an implied version of consent towards one where consent 
it wordlessly presumed, it is questionable if it is in line with the basis of arbitration. With 
reference to the previously stated case of Sunkist, it has for example been argued that this way 
of binding the non-signatory only with reference to the nexus between the parties has led 	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185 Stavros Brekoulakis, Third Parties in International Commercial Arbitration (1st edn, Oxford University 
Press 2010) 143 
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commentators to view the decisions as relying on considerations of equity and efficiency as 
opposed to consent.186 This is an obvious problem. Even if it is more efficient to join entities 
on this basis, it is not in line with the basis of arbitration. 
 
It has also been pointed out that in the last couple of years it has become easier in the U.S. to 
invoke arbitration through the method of estoppel. The courts have “continued to be willing to 
expand that agreement to extend to others […] Our decisions may not call the governing 
principle consent, but that would be as good a name for it as any”187. It has been held that the 
courts have expanded the use of estoppel outside the boundaries set forth in contract law and 
this to the extent that it is invalid under contract law.188 An explanation of why the 
requirements of consent should be lower than in regard to other contract is additionally not 
found in the theory of arbitration.189 
 
If the courts no longer can find implied consent through the method, it has to be seen as 
extending beyond contract- and agency law. And that would be the very law which the courts 
several times has stated as being the foundation and starting point of interpreting contracts 
and arbitration agreements. 
 
It has been held that “in the intertwined estoppel the importance of consent has been 
practically diminished, and even on some occasions overlooked. Strictly speaking, the term 
‘non-signatory’ is a euphemism here, as the crux of the matter is not the lack of signature but 
the lack of consent. In some cases, the ‘non-signatory’ parties are actually third parties stricto 
sensu.”190. 
 
In regard to the group of companies doctrine, it is argued that “the crux here is whether the 
non-signatory has validly agreed with the other signatories to be bound by the arbitration 
agreement, not whether the scope of an arbitration agreement extends to cover a non-
signatory. An arbitration agreement, as is the case with any other contract, cannot bind a third 	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party merely because it exists between two others”191. Furthermore, the validity for the non-
signatory to be joined to the arbitration agreement should not be made in reference to the 
existing signatories. Even if these were found not to be bound by the agreement, the third 
party should anyways be able to be bound by the contract. This would ensure that consent 
really was at hand for the non-signatory.  
 
It can further be stated that as the court or tribune assumes jurisdiction over non-signatory 
companies, as part of a corporate group within the group of companies theory, they by that 
interfere with the theories of limited liability and legal independence of companies. One can 
ponder over why such interference is deemed acceptable in regard to arbitration, but not in 
regard to ordinary contract law. 
 
The separability principle is here an important factor, even though it unfortunately is not 
discussed in most cases. As argued, the consent needs to be found in regard to the actual 
arbitration agreement. It cannot be deemed enough that awareness exists in regard to the main 
agreement or even to the arbitration agreement, consent in some form needs to be seen and 
evidenced in regard to the arbitration agreement.  
 
To briefly mention the in writing requirement, which today may be referred to more as a 
principle than a strict formal requirement, it is no longer part of the international commerce 
that all agreements must be written, however the articles mentioned can in light of the rest of 
the principles of arbitration, be seen as upholding the principle of party autonomy of the 
signatories. 
 
It is also held, with regard to all these methods, that presumption of consent may eventually 
lead to the unjustifiable compromise of the requirement of consent. It is held that: 
 
The principle of in favorem validitatis is not applicable to this issue, and 
therefor there can be no presumption in favor of the existence of the intention to 
arbitrate as non-signatory theories tend to argue.192 Eventually, non-signatory 
theories may unwarrantedly lower the threshold of required consent and 	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compromise the very same they originally intended to observe, namely the 
requirement of consent to arbitrate.193 
 
This pinpoints the problem seen in regard to the methods; they are not in line with the basis of 
arbitration and questions should be raised if they should be allowed to be used. As the 
fundamental principle of arbitration is consent, and as these methods exceed the scope of 
consent, it means that it no longer is in line with the basis of arbitration. As the scope of 
extending the arbitration agreement is not in line with the requirement of contract 
interpretation within contract- and agency law, the methods might not be acceptable. 	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7	  Conclusion	  
As indicated in the previous analysis, this thesis concludes several problems concerning the 
binding of non-signatories in international commercial arbitration. First, the methods of 
arbitral estoppel and group of companies have expanded and developed considerably in a 
short period of time, indicating a need of binding non-signatories to arbitration agreements. 
As the current regulation of international commercial arbitration does not concern itself with 
the non-signatory issue, it is needed for the courts and tribunals to deal with this outside of the 
current legislation. If the courts are to do so, it is important that the decision of binding a non-
signatory have its basis in contract- or agency law. Otherwise, there is no real justification for 
using any of the methods. One can question if the intertwined version of estoppel really have 
its basis in the contract law of the U.S., especially as it has developed only in the area of 
arbitration, and is not part of U.S. regular contract law. 
 
Furthermore, even if a need exists of binding non-signatories to arbitration agreements the 
intertwined method of estoppel and the group of companies doctrine seems to have evolved 
outside of the boundaries first set in regard to the methods. The requirements for the 
application of the methods have changed considerably and some are no longer being applied. 
Regard is no longer taken of the first so important limitations of the methods, instead a shift 
towards the efficiency of the arbitration procedure is seen. It seems more important that the 
non-signatory can be part of the procedure than that the requirements for the applicable 
method are discussed and clearly established. One example is that the requirement for the 
contractual closeness in regard to the intertwined version of estoppel is fulfilled already when 
two companies work on the same construction site. This is highly questionable. 
 
It can also be noted that the methods from the beginning were invented to easier find consent 
in cases where uncertainty regarding that fact existed. Today, it seems to be used as a way of 
presuming consent in all cases where the court or tribune holds the requirements of the 
methods for fulfilled. This of course leads to one of the main points of this thesis, the 
importance of consent. The methods might be an efficient, practical and convenient way of 
bringing together several disputes and parties to one procedure but caution needs to be taken 
as the basis of arbitration always has been, and is, consent. This thesis concludes that even if 
the issue of consent was discussed when the methods developed, it is no longer the main 
question when the courts or tribunes discusses the non-signatory issue. Often when the 
methods are used, the issue of consent is not even mentioned. It seems that as long as the 
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requirements for the methods are fulfilled, the question if the non-signatory actually has 
consented, is not important. 
 
Furthermore, if the non-signatory expresses a reluctance to join the arbitration proceedings, 
that fact has to be taken into account and be given evidential value. As arbitration restricts the 
parties’ fundamental freedoms to a fair trial, caution when binding non-signatories to the 
procedure needs to be taken. The only way to waive the right to a fair trial is to agree to 
arbitrate. It is therefore of uttermost importance that the agreement to arbitrate is clear from 
the circumstances at hand. The goal should not be to try to extend the arbitration agreements 
to parties related to the dispute. The goal should instead be to define the parties that actually 
have consented to arbitrate.  
 
The principles or requirements existing today in regard to arbitration are for example the 
separability principle and the parties’ consent to arbitration. The use of arbitral estoppel and 
group of companies doctrine makes it possible to take one company’s performance in 
accordance with a main contract as acceptance of the arbitration agreement contained therein. 
It is questionable if this is in line with the separability principle as it states that the aim is to 
find consent in regard to the arbitration agreement, not to the main contract. Also the fact that 
the parties’ consent is not expressly discussed when binding a non-signatory is problematic, 
as it does not ensure that the requirement is in fact fulfilled. As regard is not taken to these 
issues, this thesis concludes that the principles and requirements for a valid arbitration are not 
being fulfilled when applying the methods. 
 
The problems arising when countries have different views on what is needed to restrict 
entities rights to litigate are several. First, the predictability of arbitration when different 
applications of the methods are seen worldwide cause uncertainty on the global arena, which 
might lead to a restrictiveness when comes to signing arbitration agreements. If entities does 
not know with whom they might have to arbitrate, with basis in what laws, or what these laws 
will conclude, they might be reluctant to sign an arbitration agreement or to perform in 
accordance with a contract containing one. In the long term this could lead to a decrease of 
the use of arbitration, something that would be very unfortunate as it is, as initially stated in 
this thesis, the principal way of settling complicated international disputes.  
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Second, even if the use of one method is accepted in a country, difficulties arise when the 
following award is to be enforced abroad. As the disputes are international, one of the main 
reasons for choosing arbitration instead of court proceedings is that the enforcement of the 
awards are made simple through the New York Convention. However, if an award based on 
these controversial methods are to be enforced somewhere else, it is not as simple as intended. 
As the countries of enforcement can refuse to enforce an award if it is obvious that the basis 
of the decision is not coherent with the law of the enforcement country, it leads to difficulties. 
The need for international enforcement still exists as companies often have assets in other 
countries than that of the dispute. If enforcement is refused, there really was no point in 
arbitrating to begin with. 
 
As of today, the regulation of international commercial arbitration does not deal with the issue 
of joining third parties. For an efficient arbitral proceeding there is today clearly a need for 
the courts and tribunals to be able to bind non-signatories in international disputes. This need 
has been expressed through case law since the methods of binding non-signatories have 
developed. As no regulation on the area exists, this thesis concludes a need for international 
regulation on binding non-signatories. This, for a more efficient and coherent approach, 
which would serve the needs in international trade. Furthermore the trust in international 
arbitration has to be maintained and there has to exist predictability. If international 
regulations on binding non-signatories cannot be agreed, the requirement of consent needs to 
be loosened in favor of a more jurisdictional approach. The center of the discussion would 
then not be if the parties have consented or not but which entities that are to be seen as 
involved in the dispute. It of course does not solve the problem with regard to the 
predictability of arbitration as it is for the different jurisdictions to decide how to bind third 
parties. It can however be a way forward as the regulation existing at this point are not in line 
with the needs of international arbitration of today. 
 
As arbitration is such a recognized and established mean of solving international disputes, the 
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